Summary of Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 107 by Nielsen, Aubree
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
12-21-2006
Summary of Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op.
No. 107
Aubree Nielsen
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nielsen, Aubree, "Summary of Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 107" (2006). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 520.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/520
Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 107 (Dec. 21, 2006)1
 
CRIMINAL LAW—HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a 
criminal case.  
  
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order dismissing appellant’s 
petition.  The court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate appellant’s 
conviction for attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 1993, four men, including appellant Johnnie Mitchell, participated in the armed 
robbery of a casino.  The men were inside the casino when Keel, an unarmed security guard, 
asked them for identification because he thought they looked underage.  Keel began escorting the 
men out of the casino when they failed to produce identification.   
 Smith was one of the four men.  As they were walking, Smith pulled a gun and pointed it 
at Keel’s head.  A struggle ensued when Keel attempted to grab the weapon from Smith.  During 
the struggle, Smith was shot in the leg and fell to the ground.  Keel dropped his radio during the 
struggle and ran toward the security office to get another radio.  Smith fired two shots at Keel, 
but neither shot struck him. 
 Meanwhile, two of the four men jumped into the casino’s cashier counter and took 
money from the cash registers.  At least one of the two men was armed.  The fourth man stayed 
outside the cashier’s cage, which one cashier occupied at the time of the robbery.  There was 
conflicting trial testimony regarding whether Mitchell was the unarmed fourth man, or whether 
he was armed and jumped into the cashier cage.  After acquiring the money, all four men fled the 
scene. 
 Mitchell was charged with aiding and abetting attempted murder with the use of a deadly 
weapon, aiding and abetting robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, burglary while in 
possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, and conspiracy to commit 
robbery.  A jury convicted Mitchell of all charges except the charge of possession of a firearm by 
an ex-felon. 
 On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell’s conviction.2  Mitchell 
then filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied.  
The state supreme court affirmed the district court’s denial of that petition.3  Mitchell then came 
                                                 
1 By Aubree Nielsen 
2 Mitchell v. State, 114 Nev. 1417, 971 P.2d 813 (1998), overruled in part by Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648 56 P.3d 
868 (2002). 
3 Mitchell v. State, Docket No. 38359 (Order of Afffirmance, July 11, 2002). 
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before the state supreme court on appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his second post-
conviction for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Mitchell argued that the district court erred in rejecting claims presented in his post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Mitchell alleged, in part, that his conviction for 
attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon as an aider and abettor should be vacated in 
light of the court’s decision in Sharma v. State,4  which was issued after Mitchell’s conviction 
became final.  The court considered as a matter of first impression whether Sharma applied to 
convictions that became final before the court decided Sharma. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Mitchell filed an untimely petition more than five years after the court issued a remitter in 
his direct appeal.  The petition was also successive because Mitchell had already sought relief for 
a writ of habeas corpus.  Further, the elapsed time between Mitchell’s conviction and the filing 
of his petition presumably prejudiced the State in its ability to conduct a retrial. 
 However, the court recognized that Mitchell could demonstrate a fundamental injustice 
sufficient to overcome the procedural bars to the untimely or successive petition because he was 
actually innocent of aiding or abetting attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon. 
 
Attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon 
 
 Mitchell claimed that his conviction of aiding or abetting attempted murder was improper 
because he did not have the specific intent that Keel be killed and thus was actually innocent of 
the charge.  Mitchell had already raised this argument on direct appeal, therefore making that 
decision the law of the case.  However, Sharma specifically overruled the decision in Mitchell’s 
direct appeal.  Therefore, the court declined to apply the law of the case doctrine to Mitchell’s 
attempted murder claim because it would have been unfair to apply the law to Mitchell’s case 
when it had already been expressly overruled. 
 The court noted that Nevada’s aiding and abetting statute5 does not specify what mental 
state is required to be convicted as an aider and abettor.   However, the court looked at two 
Nevada cases6 and concluded that Mitchell could have only been guilty of attempted murder if 
he specifically intended to aid Smith in killing Keel and if he specifically intended that Keel be 
killed.   
 Nevertheless, the court adopted the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine in 
deciding Mitchell’s direct appeal and held that “a conviction for attempted murder will lie even 
if the defendant did not have the specific intent to kill provided the attempted murder was the 
natural and probable consequence of the aider and abettor’s target crime.”7  However, four years 
later the court specifically “disapproved and overruled” Mitchell in Sharma to the extent it 
endorsed the natural and probable consequences doctrine.8
 The court agreed that Mitchell was entitled to the vacatur of his attempted murder 
conviction pursuant to Sharma if the decision applied retroactively to cases that were final when 
                                                 
4 118 Nev. 648, 56 P.3d 868 (2002). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (2005). 
6 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 844, 944 P.2d 240 (1997); Keys v. State, 104 Nev. 736, 766 P.2d 270 (1988). 
7 Mitchell, 114 Nev. at 1427, 971 P.2d at 820. 
8 Sharma, 118 Nev. at 655, 56 P.3d at 872. 
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the court decided Sharma.  The court began by looking at whether Sharma announced a new rule 
or merely clarified the law, which the court assessed using the guidelines set forth in Colwell v. 
State.9  The court concluded that Sharma was a clarification of the law, not a new rule, and 
therefore applied to Mitchell. 
 Accordingly, the court held that under Sharma, the jury should not have convicted 
Mitchell of attempted murder as an aider or abettor unless he, not just Smith, had the specific 
intent that Keel be killed.  In its closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor acknowledged that 
Mitchell did not have the specific intent to kill.  Therefore, the court concluded that Mitchell was 
actually innocent of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon and thus vacated his 
conviction of that charge. 
 
Deadly weapon enhancement to the robbery charge 
 
 Although Mitchell claimed he was actually innocent of the weapon enhancement to the 
robbery charge, the court noted that Mitchell failed to demonstrate that its prior holding 
affirming the charge was clearly erroneous.  Unlike Mitchell’s attempted murder claim, Sharma 
had no bearing on the prior holding regarding this charge.  Thus, the court concluded the claim 
was barred. 
 
Sua sponte jury instruction 
 
 Mitchell also claimed the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte give a jury instruction 
defining the “use” of a deadly weapon.  However, the court concluded that Mitchell waived this 
claim by failing to argue it in his direct appeal.  Furthermore, he failed to demonstrate just cause 
and prejudice sufficient to overcome this waiver. 
 
Concurrence/Dissent 
 
BECKER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 Justice Becker concurred with the majority’s holding that Sharma represented a 
clarification of the law and therefore applied retroactively.  Becker also concurred that Mitchell 
did not intend to aid and abet in a murder or attempted murder so the court was correct in 
vacating his conviction for attempted murder. 
 However, Justice Becker dissented from the language in the opinion that suggested one 
must have the specific intent to kill, rather than the language from Sharma wherein one must 
have the specific intent to aid and abet in the crime. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court concluded that Sharma clarified the law and therefore applied retroactively to 
cases that were final before the court decided it.  The court also found that the holding in Sharma 
required the court to vacate Mitchell’s conviction for attempted murder with the use of a deadly 
weapon, in light of the State’s concession at trial that Mitchell lacked the specific intent to kill.  
Further, the court concluded that Mitchell’s claim that he was actually innocent of the deadly 
                                                 
9 188 Nev. 807, 819-20, 59 P.3d 463, 472 (2002). 
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weapon enhancement to the robbery conviction was barred by the law of the case and his claim 
that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the definition of the use of 
a deadly weapon is procedurally barred.  Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the district court’s order dismissing Mitchell’s petition, and remanded to the district court 
with instructions to vacate Mitchell’s conviction for attempted murder with the use of a deadly 
weapon. 
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